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Abstract— Single Sign-on (SSO) was introduced to overcome 
the issue of password memorability among users as researches 
have shown that users struggle to cope with too many sets of 
password as number of account increases. This is due to SSO 
relies on the usage of single authentication that allows users to 
access to multiple websites or services. As much as it has 
managed to solve the memorability issue to certain extend, users 
were found to have skeptical in its adoption due to security 
concerns. Among common issues of SSO is that it is prone to 
several attacks like spam, link manipulation, session hacking 
and particularly phishing. Despite of many efforts been placed 
to overcome phishing attack with regards to SSO, the 
effectiveness of the proposed solutions are yet to be proven by 
conducting extensive evaluation. Thus, this study intends to 
conduct an evaluation on a particular solution of phishing attack 
call page token. Page token was proposed recently which was 
claimed to be able to mitigate the issue of phishing attack with 
regards to SSO application. The evaluation involved a control 
laboratory experiment with participants being recruited to 
experience the usage of page token as a protection mechanism 
against phishing attack. The results showed are promising along 
with several suggestions given for further enhancement. 
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Nowadays, security measure is an important aspect for 
preventing and protecting the confidentiality of data. 
Recently, Single Sign-on (SSO) was introduced to replace 
conventional authentication method that is said to solve the 
issue of password memorability. According to Open Group, 
SSO is a protocol that requires single action of user 
authentication that can granted a user to get access for all 
systems and services where users get permission to access 
with the usage of only one password rather than multiple 
passwords [1].  There are some protocols that have been used 
in SSO such as Keberos, SAML, OpenID, OAuth and 
Inforcard. However, this study will focus on OpenID since it 
is the most commonly used protocols in SSO. Some web 
services are using OpenID as their security tools such as 
Microsoft, Symantec, Google and Verizon [2]. 
The introduction of this SSO was claimed to release user’s 
burden from memorizing many usernames and passwords for 
different account. According to password habit study on 
password memorability, a typical account holder has about 
twenty five different accounts that require different sets of 
usernames and passwords thus the effort to memorize 
password is really a huge challenge [3].  This study also 
estimated that a user has to type eight different passwords per 
day and this situation creates an extra burden on user 
especially when it comes to managing password efficiently. 
Despite of its advantages in reducing users burden to 
memorize passwords, this OpenID protocol has several 
known vulnerabilities. Among the most common is that it is 
prone to phishing attack [4]. Researchers in [5] revealed that 
phishing attack in OpenID is also possible to happen even 
when Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) is in operation. A research 
by [6] also supported the claim that SSO is also prone to 
session hijacking and phishing attack. When further research 
is done on this phishing attack, it was discovered that one of 
the possibility that this phishing attack becomes common is 
due to the availability of phishing tools to be manipulated in 
the market.  In the context of OpenID, the phisher will take 
username and password and they can act as a legitimate user 
and will get full access and control from the system. Due to 
this situation, phisher will take advantage and able to 
manipulate this limitation of memory problem.  
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Many security issues on OpenID have been reported with 
regards to the implementation of SSO such as single 
credential, hijacking and phishing. One of the most common 
issues that have been raised in OpenID is phishing which is 
due to the advancement of phishing technologies and 
techniques. It had caused many financial agencies to have 
loss billions of money either consumers or e-commerce 
companies. Alrodhan & Alqarni [7] reported that phishing 
attack is one of the major security issues with regards to 
OpenID because of the lack of documentation of the OpenID. 
OpenID standards are rapidly gaining adoption on the Web 
and they enable over one billion user accounts. However, the 
large scale for phishing attack to SSO systems has been 
significantly underestimated. 
According to the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) 
first half  2017 report [8], the total number of phishing that 
quarter year was reported at 50, 720 involved the top three 
countries like United State, Brazil and Ireland with 1269, 475 
and 221 cases respectively in the month of June 2017. It 
involved of several major industries due to the availability of 
phishing tools and techniques that requires minimal effort 
from the attackers to manipulate its usage in order to gain 
access to user IDs and passwords thru fake websites. 
There are several solutions that have been proposed to 
overcome the issues of phishing attacks in OpenID. One of 
the most common is relying on user awareness [9]. However 
this approach is very challenging as users are known to be the 
weakest in the link when it comes to security. They are easily 
manipulated as always regarded security as secondary tasks 
and will prioritize their main agenda over security without 
hesitation. This makes user awareness approach the least 
preferable solution. Moreover, with the advancement of 
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technologies these days, tools to generate phishing attack are 
readily available in the market which is among the factors that 
increases phishing attacks.  
The Secure Socket Layer is another solution [10], which 
was proposed to protect and secure OpenID protocol. 
However, SSL is not sufficient to protect OpenID protocol 
from being compromised. The key issue with SSL is when 
user’s lack of security knowledge. Attackers can manipulate 
this weakness as most users seldom know how to verify the 
SSL certificates in the web browser and acquaint the details 
presented in the certificate. In other words, when the solution 
requires technicality, it may be too complicated for users to 
rely on as effective protection mechanism. 
Other solution such as nonce and cookies [11] are usually 
set as default security. The nonce work if user is the first one 
to use OpenID identifier. However, fast attacker who is 
sniffing the communication channel can obtain the URL and 
reset a user Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection 
and steal the user session ID. There are also solutions that 
attempt to combine nonce with cookies. One time cookies 
(OTC) generate one token per request that is unique using 
Hash-based cookies Message Authentication Code (HMAC), 
which provides the prevention from the attackers to steal a 
session ID. However, the usage of OTC is limited since it is 
only available with WordPress OTC plug-in and OTC 
extension for Firefox only.    
Browser’s fingerprint [12] is an approach that user does not 
need to change underlying user browser and can use the initial 
authentication process to build further security measurement. 
It will register the user browser and user system (i.e., 
operating system and system architecture) when user request 
service. Web server will reset the connection if it identified. 
However, it has limitation because the HTTP headers and 
their ordering as well as user browser and can be set 
arbitrarily. Furthermore, browser’s fingerprint has complex 
architecture. All existing solutions as discussed above do not 
solve the phishing attack totally and still have their own 
limitations. In order to overcome the phishing problem, page 
token was introduced recently as a mechanism to thwart 
phishing attack. 
This proposed solution was inspired by research in [13] 
whereby it is implemented as double factor authentication. 
Similar to other proposed solutions, page token requires an 
extensive evaluation to demonstrate its true capability as 
protection mechanism towards phishing attack. Thus, this 
study will conduct an evaluation of page token as protection 
mechanism against phishing attack in OpenID SSO. The next 
section will elaborate further on the implementation of page 
token with regards to this study.  
 
III. PAGE TOKEN IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Page token refers to a mechanism which acts as a second 
authentication after logging to the system in order to allow 
user to proceed further using the system. Page token will be 
generated by IdP (Identity Provider) by using combination of 
one-time random password and encrypted page token for user 
machine identification. This approach was used for an 
alternate email address or short messaging system (SMS) 
where user will retrieve the one time password (OTP) and 
will expire after single use [14]. The IdP generates page token 
that will be send to user based on registered email or mobile 
number and then it will send authentication protocol 
simultaneously to user for authentication reason [15]. User 
must send the page token to RP (Relying Party) to validate 
the user – whether they are legitimate or not. If the page token 
matched then the user will be granted to use the system - 
otherwise, the user will be blocked and the system will 
recognize that as phishing attempt. By embedding page token 
into OpenID, if the phisher or attacker got ID and password, 
they will be able to login to the system only. They are not able 
to do any activities such as transaction, transferring, copying 
or deleting that as a part of the functions of the system 
because any operation of the system must be authenticated by 
page token. Page token will be sent to the registered hand 
phone number or email only to receive page token as second 
credential for user to send to the system. 
The existing OpenID has one layer but the OpenID with 
page token has two layers. These layers help to protect and 
mitigate from unwanted user that often ignored. The more 
layers of security applied, the better it is for protection effort. 
OpenID with page token is said to offer additional security 
layer as the first layer acts as primary authentication that will 
detect, deter and delay unwanted access. It also provides a 
limitation for unwanted user by providing personal audit by 
system requesting ID and password for user recognition. For 
second layer as secondary authentication for protecting the 
further access that restricted by system. User need to request 
access and system will send page token to user’s email and 
user need to enter the given token to get grant access from 
system to do any activity in the system. The goal of secondary 
security layer is to monitor unwanted access and conduct 




The methodology of this study consists of five phases. 
They are identification of problem, developing prototype of 
the page token, evaluation, analysis and conclusion. This 
study starts with identification of problem through 
conducting literature reviews on related research on OpenID 
SSO and phishing attack. Once the problem has been 
identified, the next phase is to proceed with the core focus of 
the study. Since this study intends to conduct evaluation on a 
proposed mechanism known as page token, a prototype has 
to be developed.   
This followed by the second phase which is developing 
prototype for page token. The activities involved in this phase 
are embedding page token to OpenID environment. The 
Salesforce.com and Google Console Developer were used to 
build a prototype of page token. An email was used as 
platform for authentication for Google Console Developer 
and Salesforce.com. The Page Token was generated and sent 
via email as second credential to validate user. Once the 
prototype is ready, the study proceeds to the next phase.  
The third phase involved conducting the evaluation where 
by a control laboratory experiment was used as an approach 
to evaluate the prototype. The experiment was mainly 
intended to measure the performance of page token in SSO 
environment and observe how users cope with the proposed 
mechanism. The next phase following the experiment is the 
analysis phase where the data gathered will be analyzed 
before finally a conclusion and several suggestions can be 




An Evaluation of Page Token in OpenId Single Sign on (SSO) to thwart Phishing Attack 
 e-ISSN: 2289-8131   Vol. 10 No. 1-11 21 
V. EVALUATION 
 
This study aims to evaluate the page token as 
countermeasure in thwarting phishing attack. In order to 
conduct the evaluation, control laboratory experiment was 
used to measure the effectiveness of page token. The 
experiment conducted at one higher learning institution in the 
Northern region of Malaysia involving a total of 26 
participants. The participants were recruited based on 
voluntarily aspect and they were requested to complete the 
consent form before participating. A quick briefing was also 
conducted at the beginning of the session to give all the 
participants some ideas on how the whole session will be 
conducted.  They were also given an awareness talk to 
motivate them to participate in the experiment. Out of 26 
participants recruited, 18 participants proceeded to the next 
stage. Note that participants were given total flexibility to 
withdraw at any time if they feel uneasy of refuse to proceed 
as to ensure the experiment is totally based on voluntarily 
aspects. Further details of the experiment are as discuss 
below:  
 
A. The Apparatus 
The prototype worked on Macbook Pro with windows and 
Mac OS platforms. The laptop has display with13.3-inch 
(diagonal) LED-backlit glossy widescreen display with 
support for millions of colors, 2.5GHz dual-core Intel Core i5 
processor (Turbo Boost up to 3.1GHz) with 3MB L3 cache, 
configurable to 2.9GHz dual-core Intel Core i7 (Turbo Boost 
up to 3.6GHz) with 4MB shared L3 cache, 4GB of 1600MHz 
DDR3 memory and 500GB 5400-rpm hard drive. The 
reasons phishing technique was tested on these platforms to 
fulfill availability and validity in thwarting phishing attack in 
cross platform. This apparatus was used to attack participants 
account as victim by phisher. 
For phishing experiment, participants used Hewlett 
Packard (HP) and Samsung Chromebook. The HP notebook 
with features such as Windows 10 Home 64, Intel® 
Pentium® N3700, 29.5 cm (11.6") diagonal HD 
touchscreen, 4GB RAM with 1TB storage and B&O 
PLAY with 2 speakers. The second was Samsung 
Chromebook futures with a 11.6-inch screen; lighter and 
thinner; and very different under the hood. The Samsung 
Chromebook uses a low-power processor, Samsung's Exynos 
5 Dual, which is built on ARM's new dual-core system-on-a-
chip Cortex A15 design (prior versions used Intel Atom and 
Celeron processors). It also has just 2GB of system memory. 
Two extended monitors were connected to the both notebook 
heading to observer for monitoring reason.  
 
B. The Procedures 
This experiment used impersonates phishing technique to 
attack participants as victims. This experiment was to 
measure the number of successful attack and number of 
unsuccessful attack. The variable involved are successful 
attack and unsuccessful attack to be used to measure phishing 
attack for OpenID without page token and OpenID with page 
token. For dependent variable involved environment that 
consist of OpenID without page token and OpenID with page 
token and the rest are independent variable. 
Before the experiment, participants were giving 
explanation about the awareness, OpenID and SSO. The 
explanation provided the participants with some knowledge 
about awareness that related to phishing attack in OpenID and 
how the phishing works. They were also exposed on how to 
recognize and make comparison between fake website and 
the real website and inculcated participants how the best way 
to react when receive phishing email. At the beginning of the 
experimental session, participants were divided into two 
groups; experimental group (i.e.: 9 participants to be tested 
for OpenID with page token) and control group (i.e.: 9 
participants for OpenID without page token). The participants 
from experimental group were requested to use default email 
account due to time constraint, while those in the control 




Figure 1: The flow of phishing attack 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the procedures involved in phishing 
attack. During this experiment, researcher acted as dummy 
phisher to attack participants as victims by sending phishing 
email seem as legitimate company’s email that provide link 
to user’s email to phish them that aimed to take ID and 
password. Phisher used AB Bulk Mailer 9.0 for launching 
attack by using impersonation technique. The email was 
appealed victims to login to the system for solving problem 
that somebody tried to get ID and password for stealing 
reason. The appearance of the fake website that linked to 
victim’s email was same with the original make victims were 
confidence to do logging. When victims clicked on the given 
link, it was directed to the fake website. Victims should enter 
ID and password for updating authentication. They did that 
action was influenced by important word in title, they had 
worried about money to be stolen, they feel confidence 
because the email was sending by Salesforce Company, the 
email was mentioned about stealing reason if the ID and 
password do not update. This action will trap victims fall in 
phishing attack. The entered ID and password will have 
directed to phisher database. For the next step, phisher will 
take ID and password and act as legitimate user for attacking 
the victims account. Data was recorded to be used in analysis.  
 
C. Evaluation Metrics 
This study has evaluated page token performance by using 
security metric to measure the robustness of page token. This 
evaluation need metric requirement for validating the page 
token in thwarting phishing attack as metrics below and we 
explain the preliminary setup of the security metrics 
experiments. The proposed evaluation security metric to 
validate the protocol of page token as counter measure that 
influences the security of OpenID. This experiment proposed 
to use number of successful logins and number of 
unsuccessful logins by following Network Security Metrics 
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Program [16]. The security metrics will describe as follow.  
The number of successful logins in one of the metrics being 
used to refer to successful attack and measured the successful 
login trial to attack by counting how many time phisher 
successfully login to saleforce.com for attacking reason. This 
experiment for this metric measured to OpenID without page 
token environment and compared to OpenID with page token. 
If the phisher successful login to the system, this means that 
the system has been successfully attacked by phisher and the 
system is not secure enough to be used. This metric presented 
the total number of successful login. The reason of this metric 
is to measure the quantity of the number of successful login 
exposes to the risk phishing attack. There following 
assumption is used in the experimental setting that is – “the 
total number of success trial to login into OpenID 
authentication system that phisher had to attack to OpenID 
without page token and OpenID with page token counting as 
successful logins”. Therefore based on this assumption, the 
opposite of it will indicate the contradicting positions. 
 
VI. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
 
The performance of OpenID has been evaluated based on 
without page token and compared to the OpenID with page 
token by using laboratory experiment as shown in the 
following metrics below. As mentioned previously, each 
participant was requested to login to their account. The 
phishing attack was launched at each individual participant 
from both control and experimental group. Results in Table 1 
showed that those in the attack were more successful in the 
experimental group compared to control group. This indicates 
that the page token only managed to mitigate phishing attack 
to certain extend. Besides that, we observed participants 
during experiment to see how they cope with the proposed 
solutions. It was found that only one participant had extra 
awareness that he did not fall for the phishing attack.  There 
were two participants who only realized that they were 
phished after they completed the experiment while the 
remaining of the participants had no idea at all that they were 
being phished. This observation results indicate that despite 
the proposed solution, user’s awareness still play an 
important role in mitigating phishing attack.  
 
Table 1 
 Number of Successful versus Unsuccessful Logins Trial  
 
Result Control Group Experimental Group 
Successful logins (attack) 8 9 





In this paper, an evaluation has been conducted to measure 
the performance of page token authentication protocol. The 
performance was measured based on number of successful 
logins versus number of unsuccessful logins that indicates 
successful attack and unsuccessful attack respectively. 
However, results shown that there is no significant difference 
between both control and experimental group. Based on our 
observation, this is probably due to awareness still plays an 
important role in phishing attack, where user should make 
decision before clicking any link that was sent via emails. In 
other words, it also makes phishing easy to work for OpenID 
environment because phishing rely on social engineering 
technique that relates to human psychology and difficult to 
penetrate phishing attack. Furthermore, this is due to sending 
the page token to email as second credential is not sufficient 
since phisher has captured ID and password during the first-
time login (at phished website). This shows the role of 
awareness is very important in thwarting phishing attack. 
Even, based on the observation, during the experiment 
reveals that victims know about phishing but do not know 
how phishing works and they failed to realize that they fall as 
victims. This is a very crucial finding that should be taken 
into consideration when designing future solutions for 
mitigating such attacks. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
This study has presented an evaluation of page token by 
using impersonate technique of phishing attack to determine 
its applicability as a countermeasure. At the beginning of the 
research we anticipate that page token will be able to act as a 
countermeasure to certain extent in thwarting phishing attack. 
A simple prototype was developed to enable us to conduct an 
evaluation through a control laboratory experiment. The 
results indicated that the applicability of page token is 
strongly accompanied by the user’s awareness which highly 
influences their security behavior. 
Based on the outcome of this research, it is recommended 
that in order for the page token to be more effective, the 
countermeasure should be sent via short messaging services 
(SMS) instead of email since the attacker can easily 
manipulate the phishing victims via email. Alternatively, it 
could also be more effective if the users supply an additional 
email as an alternative for sending the page token. These 
would be our primary focus in the near coming project. In 
addition, our research team is also interested in investigating 
further the page token applicability on other types of phishing 
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